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Abstract
Educational reforms in African countries that are spearheaded by international do-
nor agencies like the World Bank have earned the skeptical eye of policy analysts
and scholars both locally and abroad. The World Bank’s Structural Adjustment
Programme, for instance, has been faulted for increased drop-outs in schools, espe-
cially by the poor, and for the general retreat from financing education by national
governments. This paper presents a different argument. It examines the success
attained in Kenya’s informal sector training programme, the Jua Kali Voucher Train-
ing Programme (JKVTP), a collaboration between the World Bank, the Kenyan
Government and the private sector. Using loose coupling as an analytical frame-
work, we illustrate why the voucher system, a World Bank reform, has worked
with the JKVTP but failed to materialise in Kenya’s higher education. By analyz-
ing the coupling arrangements with the political state, markets, and policymaking,
we demonstrate why vouchers generate differential outcomes in the two sectors of
education. The paper concludes by suggesting policy implications for Kenya’s uni-
versities.
Résumé
Dans les pays africains, les réformes en matière d'éducation, conduites par les agences
de financement internationales, telles que la Banque Mondiale, laissent sceptiques
les analystes spécialisés en politique publique, ainsi que les universitaires locaux et
internationaux. Par exemple, le Programme d'Ajustement Structurel de la Banque
Mondiale a été pointé du doigt pour avoir augmenté le taux d'abandon dans les
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écoles, particulièrement chez les pauvres, mais a également été accusé d'amener les
gouvernements nationaux à retirer leurs financements à l'éducation. Cet article
présente un argument tout à fait différent. Il examine le succès remporté par le
programme de formation du secteur informel Kenyan, prénommé le  Jua Kali Voucher
Training Programme (JKVTP), qui est le fruit d'une collaboration entre la Banque
Mondiale, le gouvernement kenyan et le secteur privé. En se servant du loose cou-
pling comme cadre analytique, nous montrons ici pourquoi le système des bons, qui
constitue une réforme de la Banque Mondiale, a fonctionné pour le JKVTP, mais
n'est pas parvenu à se matérialiser dans le domaine de l'enseignement supérieur
kenyan. En analysant le fonctionnement entre l'état politique, les marchés et le
système de prise de décision, nous montrons pourquoi le système de bons produit
des résultats différentiels dans les deux secteurs de l'éducation. Cet article conclut
en présentant quelques implications en matière de politique publique, concernant
les universités kenyanes.
The Argument
It is not often that concepts like ‘loose coupling’ and ‘educational vouchers’
are discussed with informal training. Yet in Kenya, such a discussion offers
valid insights into the success of educational vouchers in one sector but their
non-implementation in another. The success of vouchers in financing informal
training among self-employed artisans invites the question of why such an
achievement has failed to materialise in financing higher education. This ques-
tion is even more appropriate given the criticism that has accompanied
privatisation initiatives in the educational sector, particularly when interna-
tional donor agencies like the World Bank are the catalysts (Munene 2003;
Zeleza 2003).
A basic question is how we explain the success of the bank’s projects among
low-income groups. What lessons do such successes hold for other sectors?
The apparent success of the bank-sponsored educational voucher scheme for
financing informal sector training warrants analysis. Using loose coupling as
an analytical framework, this paper argues that political influence, market co-
ordination and democratic policymaking have contributed to the different out-
comes for vouchers in the two educational sectors.
The Case for and against Educational Vouchers
Educational vouchers are chits issued by a funding agency (usually govern-
ment) specifying the amount of monetary support for which a beneficiary is
eligible which he or she surrenders to an educational/training institution upon
admission. The institution returns the chit to the issuing agency for monetary
reimbursement. As defined by Dohmen (2000:4), ‘a voucher is a coupon which
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is handed over to students or their parents and entitles them to education. The
coupon represents a certain value expressed in terms of money or time’.
The relationship between the players in a voucher system is presented in
Figure 1. As the figure illustrates, the government is the principal catalyst of
the system, determines the overall functioning mechanism, and provides this
information to both students and institutions. Students can make effective deci-
sions only when sufficient information is available, in itself a major challenge.
Advocates of this system see it as an innovative way of introducing market
mechanisms into the financing of education which would be particularly useful
in higher education. The drive to expand public funding for higher education,
both public and private, in the form of vouchers has been advocated by such
multi-lateral funding agencies as the World Bank (1995, 1997), scholars
(Glewenn & Patrinos 1998; Henderson 1994; Lieberman 1991a, 1991b), and
policymakers.
Figure 1: Voucher Scheme Relationships
...activate their
vouchers by  enroll-
ing in training
programmes at..
...sets criteria for
eligibility and redemp-
tion conditions for...
...redeem student vouchers with...
Students
Educational
institutions
Government
5.munene.p65 06/05/2006, 15:33103
JHEA/RESA Vol. 3, No. 1, 2005104
Voucher advocates have cited choice as one of its cardinal benefits. Since pub-
lic education tends to be a government monopoly, it denies education consum-
ers free choice in the pursuit of education (Friedman 1962). In free-market
competition, consumers can choose the best educational alternative for them.
Educational institutions would have to be sensitive and accountable to the con-
sumers and hence would improve their product offerings. Thus, vouchers per-
form a dual role: choice for consumers, and improved educational quality from
institutions.
Another argument in support of vouchers relates to equity effects. Vouchers
tend to distribute quality to a wider segment of the population, especially low-
income groups who can thereby gain access to high-quality private institu-
tions. Most voucher advocacy is couched in terms of the distributive benefits
towards the poor as far as access to quality education is concerned. The politi-
cal implications of this view are enormous, which is why McEwan and Carnoy
(1999:11) contend that, even though only a limited number of vouchers may be
available, advocates put ‘stock in the “the rising tide lifts all boats” argument
that educational efficiency gains would be large enough to raise consumer wel-
fare among all groups’.
Not surprisingly, vouchers have also been criticised, especially for their
negative impact on equity. Critics have argued that vouchers could precipitate
educational inequities by attracting students who cost less to educate. These
lower-cost students tend to have higher socio-economic status since they can
afford to supplement public vouchers or have no special learning needs (McEwan
& Carnoy 1999).
Market-driven education systems such as those propounded by voucher
advocates have also been criticised for their effects on education quality and
external efficiency. Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) argue that student-driven
systems could erode educational standards and undermine the development of
expensive fields like the hard sciences and engineering. They also note that
vouchers function less well where labor markets do not operate smoothly. Where
graduate unemployment is high, where information about educational
programmes and their relevance to the labor market is scanty, and where the
state has historically been the main employer of college graduates, vouchers
may not offer a competitive advantage over traditional grants and loans. In
such a situation, vouchers cannot stimulate training in certain areas nor cata-
lyze competition among various institutions.
Another area of scrutiny is the extent to which public funds should subsidise
private education. In the United States, for instance, using public funds in pri-
vate higher education has been justified because they facilitate the functioning
of the academic marketplace and promote competition among all sectors of
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higher education. According to Zummeta (2001 :402), state subsidies to pri-
vate higher education are designed to nearly equalise net prices between pri-
vate and public institutions and to encourage competition between the two
sectors as long as such competition does not compromise educational quality.
Furthermore, vouchers provide an ideal arena for expressing individualism in
education. Critics, however, contend that using tax money for private institu-
tions deprives public institutions of much-needed revenue which they cannot
easily recoup because of restrictions on how they can raise additional revenue.
Furthermore, some of the goals of private institutions receiving these public
funds may be religious (Krashinsky 1986).
In Kenya, the status of vouchers remains mixed. The government wishes to
liberalise the financing of higher education through a market-based financing
arrangement. The 1994/1998 development plan was especially emphatic in the
state’s desire to make higher education market-driven (Kenya 1994, 1998), but
this goal has not yet been reached. The state articulated this market-competi-
tive policy:
The central thrust of the new policies is to rely on market forces to
mobilize resources for growth and development with the role of central
government increasingly confined to providing an effective regulatory
framework and essential public infrastructure and social services. The
government will limit direct participation in many sectors and instead
promote private sector activity (quoted in Kiamba 2004:55).
The education minister further enunciated this policy to the universities:
This is a turning point in the development of our public universities,
where they are being called upon to adopt business-like financial man-
agement styles. It is also a point in time when universities have to plan
well ahead about resources expected to be coming from sources other
than the exchequer. ... [The] time has come to seriously take account of
the universities’ potential to generate income internally. It is an open
secret that some of our universities are capable of generating substantial
amounts of money from the resources at their disposal. ... Income from
such sources should be exploited and treated as definite sources of uni-
versity revenue (quoted in Kiamba 2004:55-56).
In the meantime, calls to adopt the voucher system continue in the country’s
media, mainly fuelled by the perceived merits of accountability and quality.
One statement by a Kenyan writer captures these sentiments vividly:
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What Kenya really needs is to introduce the voucher system into the
financing of education... The voucher system simply means that instead
of the Government funding public schools directly, it does so by giving
parents a voucher which is worth a fixed amount of money... It enables
parents to have control over the education of their children, and thus
makes the teachers and the school administrators accountable to the
parents, rather than to a large and inefficient bureaucracy... In essence,
what the voucher system does for public schools is that it gives them the
advantages which make private primary schools so successful, both in
catering for diversity and in achieving excellent results in national exams.
It makes the public schools ‘market-driven’, just as the private schools
already are (Muga 2004:7).
The Kenyan government’s lack of political will to institute a voucher system
for higher education is in sharp contrast to its encouragement of the successful
Jua Kali Voucher Training Programme (JKVTP), in the informal training sector.
Voucher Financing of Higher Education: Some Global Cases
Various countries have experimented with voucher financing of higher educa-
tion. The sample that follows – Chile, Mozambique and the United States – is
chosen to amplify issues germane to the development of the financing mecha-
nism.
Chile shows that voucher-type financing of higher education has made re-
markable headway in Latin America. Up until 1980, the country had a closed
system of higher education comprised of eight universities, six private and two
public. The private universities had gradually come to resemble the public ones
(Jofre and Sancho 1991), and enrolment had declined precipitously after 1974,
due to the country’s ongoing financial crises and a prevailing perception that
university education was of poor quality. To ameliorate this situation, a 1980
law allowed the creation of additional private degree-granting universities and
colleges and a new funding formula.
This new funding formula granted vouchers to more than 66 per cent of the
top scorers in the national college entry examinations, redeemable at any pub-
lic, quasi-public or private university upon enrolment. This funding arrange-
ment had three goals: to introduce competition in higher education, to steer
institutions towards academic excellence, and to ensure efficient utilisation of
resources. Thus, enrolment-driven funding would encourage institutions to
compete for academically successful students while also providing financial
support for capable students.
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To a considerable degree, this reform has been quite successful. The pri-
vate higher education sector is large and vibrant with more than 60 universi-
ties, 80 professional institutes and 156 technical formation centers (Jofre and
Sancho 1991). The Chile case demonstrates that vouchers can be successful,
given a strong and effective government policy.
Mozambique’s case is an important milestone in the introduction of voucher
financing of higher education in Africa. The country’s 2000-2010 strategic plan
for higher education stresses the need to provide equitable access, quality and
relevance, responsiveness, sustainability, efficiency and institutional autonomy
in addition to accountability. These expectations apply to both public and pri-
vate institutions. The plan also seeks to develop and support a diversified, flex-
ible, integrated and cost-effective higher education system (Woodhall 2003:95).
The government’s National Scholarship Fund provides financial assistance to
needy students at both public and private higher education institutions. This
fund’s premise is that, if needy students in underrepresented areas can attend a
college of their choice, then financial support allowing them to do so will pre-
vent dropping out and will increase academic performance.
The United States has been the most successful country so far in develop-
ing a voucher system of financing higher education and has the most diversi-
fied funding arrangement involving both the federal and state governments. Its
largest government financing is the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (‘GI Bill’),
first implemented after World War II and reconfirmed in 1994. Veterans were
given $500 per year to cover tuition in any college of their choice and a monthly
stipend for living expenses depending on their marital status. The GI Bill vouch-
ers have been very successful in breaking down supply-side barriers and en-
hancing students’ choice because they are demand-driven (Bennett 1996). They
laid the foundation for mass higher education in the United States after World
War II by raising educational expectations of later generations.
Arizona illustrates another form of voucher-type financing of higher educa-
tion, in this case to increase attendance at the state’s private colleges. In the
1996–1997 academic year, the Arizona Commission for Post-Secondary Edu-
cation established a US $1,500 scholarship for community college graduates
who transfer to a private college within the state to complete their four-year
degree (Petrick 1996).
Ohio also has a viable voucher system which provides a uniform tuition
grant for state residents who choose to attend an independent not-for-profit
college or university. The grant equals about 25 per cent of the average state
subsidy paid to public institutions for students enroled in baccalaureate
programmes. A separate funding entity, the Instructional Grant Programme, is
need-based and sensitive to institutional costs. It supports low-income under-
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graduates in public, private, not-for-profit and proprietary (private-for-profit)
colleges and universities (Petrick 1996). Once again, the United States shows
the critical role of political will and strong government commitment in the
development of a voucher system of financing higher education.
Financing Higher Education in Kenya
Not unlike other African countries, the fiscal health of Kenya’s public higher
education is grim. The bleak reality of high operating costs, declining state
subventions coupled with increased pressure for expansion is a reality that
policymakers and administrators have to live with. That reality is a decline in
essential infrastructure, both consumable and non-consumable, that is crucial
to institutional functioning and which is reflected in the declining material con-
ditions of the campuses and teaching staff and also of and students’ welfare.
Causes of the present predicament include:
1. Rapid growth in the national population resulting in increased demand
for higher education, giving way to the ‘massification’ of the system.
2. Inflationary and recessionary pressures on the national economy lead-
ing to a sharp decline in funding for higher education.
3. Widespread poverty which makes it difficult for students to afford tu-
ition rates high enough to maintain the institutions’ fiscal health.
Until the early 1970s, Kenyan higher education was free. The government bore
the full cost of tuition and living expenses for university students. The eco-
nomic crisis of the 1970s, spurred by the oil price shocks, made this financing
mechanism unsustainable. As a result, in 1974 the government introduced a
loan scheme for all university students in the hope that students would repay
their loans upon employment, thus developing a self-sustaining revolving edu-
cation fund. The long-term view was that an efficient and equitable educational
credit market would come into being. However, inadequate loan recovery pro-
cedures and students’ unwillingness to pay combined to nullify this goal (Otieno
2004).
As fiscal crises continued to escalate, the state in 1991-1992 introduced the
cost-sharing scheme. Students would pay a tuition fee of $667 annually coupled
with a means-tested loan in which needy students would receive an award (maxi-
mum $560) annually. To further cushion disadvantaged students, a bursary
scheme was instituted to cover the difference between the loan award and the
total cost of the education. The Kenya National Assembly (Parliament)
authorised the creation of the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) to ad-
minister the cost-sharing programme.
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The HELB loan scheme has never evolved into a sustainable, efficient and
equitable voucher-type of financing higher education in Kenya. Instead, it has
become an agency awarding loans mainly to students admitted into public uni-
versities who access a larger percentage of financial aid. Table 1 shows the
pattern of loan disbursement to both public and private university students in
the 2002-2003 academic year. For public universities, 95 per cent of the appli-
cants are awarded educational loans in contrast to 77 per cent for private insti-
tutions. Only 15 per cent of the loan recipients were enroled in private univer-
sities whilst 51 per cent were in public institutions. But the sharpest contrast is
the dollar amounts awarded: more than $12 million to public universities and
more than $360,000 to private universities.
This predisposition to commit most educational loans to public university
students has resulted in limited choice in the country’s higher education sys-
tem. Since funding at public universities is almost guaranteed, students seek
admittance there, even though they must often pursue degree programmes not
of their liking and many of which offer few employment prospects. Up to 74
per cent of the students at Egerton University are not in programmes of their
choice, while the national average is 44 per cent (Joint Admissions Board 2003).
Yet the centrally controlled admission policies, coupled with HELB’s financial
aid, constrain their enrolment choices. That the system has not evolved into a
voucher-type scheme as in the JKVTP begs for a detailed analysis.
Vouchers and Informal Training: The Case of Jua Kali Programme
The Jua Kali Voucher Training Programme itself has not attracted national pub-
licity, despite its success, partly because it involves the informal education sec-
tor, which does not enjoy as much social and political prestige as university
education. Nonetheless, its continued success, given the riskiness of reforms in
financing education and training, is fascinating. That success raises several
issues regarding the nexus between politics, policy and markets.
The voucher was jointly launched by the Kenyan Government and the World
Bank in 1996 as means of increasing the technical skills of the rapidly growing
small-scale informal industrial sector. Under this project, credible and long-
standing informal sector organisations are granted government recognition and
authority to administer vouchers locally. Applicants from the informal sector
seek training vouchers from these local organisations to finance skill-upgrad-
ing training in public and private sector institutions, including technology de-
velopment for small enterprises. Upon admission, the beneficiaries surrender
their vouchers to the training provider, who redeems it through the allocation
agencies after training has been provided and before the voucher’s expiration
date.
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An assessment of the pilot programme (Adams 1997) concluded that it was
achieving most of its objectives, both in improving management practices of
the small-scale traders and by increasing profitability and earnings. Training
providers of all types were responsive, especially private ones. They more ag-
gressively marketed themselves to the allocation agencies and tailored their
programmes to suit the Jua Kali artisans, including giving examples relevant to
them. This competition among providers also resulted in reducing training costs
to the value of the voucher, meaning that the trainees did not incur additional
expense. Table 2 shows the allocation of vouchers by the Mombasa Boat Op-
erators Association. The variety of programmes range from low-tech handi-
crafts to high-tech electrical/electronics and computer studies. The providers
include a mix of public institutions like Mombasa Polytechnic and Mombasa
Technical Training Institute, private institutions like Joseline School of Cater-
ing and individual providers who offer apprenticeships. The data show that
electrical and electronic courses are the most popular – not surprising given
that the electronics industry is the fastest growing employment sector in Kenya.
The data also demonstrate the dominance of Mombasa Polytechnic, a middle-
level training college, in providing most of the training.
The Concept of Loose Coupling
Loose coupling between an organisation and its various internal and external
constituents provides a useful conceptual framework for understanding the suc-
cess or failure of educational vouchers in different contexts. Why, for instance,
has the voucher system failed to materialise in Kenyan higher education while
succeeding in the informal sector? Why, despite state universities’ inability to
meet the demand for some popular programmes, are students denied public
financial support to pursue the same programmes in private universities? We
discuss three factors that explain these contradictions and reinforce loose cou-
pling as an important analytical framework to structure the debate.
Loose coupling consists of weak or infrequent ties among entities that are
minimally interdependent (Hoy & Miskel 1991:137). Subsystems in an
organisation are tied together loosely rather than through tight bureaucratic
linkage. Potential coupling elements might include: intention and action, the
past and the present (what happened yesterday may be loosely coupled with
what happens tomorrow), means and ends, hierarchical positions, teachers and
students, teachers and materials they use or parents and teachers (Sturman
1994:3524). Educational organisations have two distinct domains in which tight
and loose coupling tendencies are articulated. The bureaucratic domain deals
with internal and managerial functions: mediating between the institution and
community, implementing the law, procuring and allocating resources, and
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mediating between the faculty and students. The professional domain, on the
other hand, is involved with the actual technical process of teaching and learn-
ing (Hoy & Miskel 1991). The bureaucratic domain is central to our focus
because it incorporates consideration of the interactions between educational
institutions and the external environment.
Educational organisations are open systems, heavily influenced by the
changes in the external environments. Competition, resource availability and
political pressures from the environment may force them to tighten or loosen
organisational linkages to survive. The external political environment may dic-
tate that the institution support its political agenda, resulting in changes in link-
ages. In Kenya, three external factors – political influence, market coordination
and democratic decision-making – constitute the dynamics within which loose
and tight coupling are articulated. The result is differentiated outcomes for
educational vouchers in two sectors of education.
Political Influence
The State’s Political Power
Educational institutions are inherently political, just as the context in which
they function is highly political. University politics encompass a variety of
political relationships among actors and groups internal and/or external to the
institutions: the state, administrators, academics, staff and students. As impor-
tant political constituents, they strongly influence institutional conflict, deci-
sion making, resource allocation and governance. While some scholars have
argued that ‘pluralism’ best describes the configuration of multiple interests,
views and groups in universities (Bucher 1970; Epstein 1974), others have
noted the state’s centrality. Waldo (1974:107) posits that the university ‘from
the beginning has had more of a governmental-political role than is customar-
ily perceived, that in the modern period its governmental-political role has been
growing in scope and importance, and that certain developments now culmi-
nating place the university at or near the center of the governmental-political
spectrum’. Both perspectives are accurate to a degree, the context being the
dominant variable that explains why one perspective will prevail in one context
but not in another.
In Kenya, as in many other African countries, the government’s influence
in steering the development and growth of public higher education is monu-
mental. Since independence, the government has developed university educa-
tion as a panacea for the social, economic and political challenges confronting
the country. As the stimulus for socio-economic development, the public uni-
versity has been the centerpiece in producing local elites and in integrating
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different sections. These elites have provided critical manpower in various
social sectors and have mediated the domestication and localisation of global
knowledge. The politicisation of Kenya’s public university reached its zenith
during the presidency of Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002). Sifuna (1998:181) notes
the role of political influence in university affairs:
The decision to establish a second university in the country without
much debate, and subsequent ones that have led to the proliferation of
public institutions of higher learning, should be interpreted in the con-
text of wider policy formulation. The policy formulation style in Kenya
has always centered on the person of the president. He sets the pace and
tone of government policy through slogans and pronouncements. This
style normally applies to all spheres of life, such as social, political,
economic and educational matters. Most major policy pronouncements
in the country are associated with the president who is supposed to be
the source of wisdom and the one who gives the policy drive, blessings
and legitimacy. It does not matter who initiates and moves the policy to
the centre, but the credit always goes to the president.
Thus, public universities in Kenya have been used effectively to promote and
sustain the legitimacy of the state.
This tight coupling between the university and the political system is im-
portant in several ways. First, it means that the state has a legitimate interest in
funding the university to steer it in specific directions. Kenyan universities are
almost exclusively dependent on the state for their recurrent and development
expenditures, a dependency which is, ironically, reflected in the declining fi-
nancial allocations. The deficits have been growing whilst the student popula-
tion and operating costs have been rising. In 1991, the deficits were more than
Ksh. 222 million (more than US$2 million) which rose to over Ksh. 500 mil-
lion (more than US$ $6 million) in 1996. By 2003, the deficits were in excess
of Ksh. 750 million ($10 million) (Ngome 2003:363). It is not far-fetched to
conclude that this financing mechanism, coupled with tight political control,
has denied universities the flexibility and autonomy to spend scarce financial
resources in innovative programming that would attract voucher-holding or
privately sponsored students. In a significant way, this coupling has contrib-
uted to the inertia at HELB. The funding body has read the state script that
promotes the latter’s political control of events on campus, including student
admissions. The funding agency dedicates the bulk of student loans to public
university students, a political strategy that has at times been used to deny
politically active students financial aid to attend college.
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The ubiquity of the state politics/university nexus is also epitomised by the
powerlessness of the Commission of Higher Education (CHE) to engage in
strategic planning for the public university sector as the commission envisioned.
Contrary to expectations, financial planning for the universities was deemed
political and left to the technocrats at CHE:
Planning was supposed to be a major function of the Commission for
Higher Education. CHE tried and set up a committee especially with
regard to financing, but it was decided that the committee should not
deal with matters relating to funding. CHE also set up a University Grants
Committee which made some plans but again it was overtaken by events.
The government seems to have approached the expansion of universi-
ties from a political point of view because it wanted to appease the pub-
lic by opening up more and more university education. The public uni-
versities . . . did not see the need of working through CHE (Sifuna
1998:187).
Besides determining the development of universities, the state has an interest
in who attends university and for what programme of study. To perpetuate its
strategic political hold on the universities, the government has exercised wide
latitude, via state-appointed university administrators, in shaping student en-
rolment. One of the state’s strategic interests lies in identifying students who
are sympathetic to its course while denying scholarship and sponsorship to
students deemed recalcitrant and critical of the state (Mwiria 2003:38). The
state’s second interest is to be seen as benevolent and, thus, responsive to the
social demand for higher education.
The dynamics of this politically managed access to university education
can be seen by the situation in 1988 when more than 13,000 students qualified
for entry into public universities which could accommodate only a quarter of
that number. President Moi ‘directed the Minister for Education and vice-chan-
cellors of the four national universities to work out ways of admitting most of
the 13,000 qualified students left out in the recent selection. ... The president
said he had been moved by appeals from affected parents, students and Kenyans
in general during the on-going public discussion’ (‘President Acts’ 1988:28).
These two factors suggest why the state has been less willing to develop such
market-oriented financial systems as vouchers; such systems would curtail the
state’s influence in student enrolment in universities.
Students as a Political Group
Tight coupling between the universities and the political system is also mani-
fested in students’ political influence. University students as a political group
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have the power to influence policy decisions in socio-economic and political
areas. The social genesis of students’ political power emanates from their his-
torically sanctioned social mission as catalysts in the democratisation move-
ment and guardians of social justice (Munene 2003). As in many other African
countries, Kenyan students were in the forefront in the struggle for nationalism
during the cold war era, were crucial in the fight to expand democratic space
during the one-party political system, and were also vocal proponents of socio-
economic equality. These roles have enjoyed a large measure of political legiti-
macy, especially during the period when opposition political parties were pro-
scribed and civil society truncated.
The existence of powerful student associations has further consolidated their
political clout in higher education. Through university-wide student associa-
tions such as the Student Organisation of Nairobi University (SONU) and in-
ter-university associations like the National Unions of Students of Kenya
(NUKS), students have articulated their views on university management and
financing policy. Through university-based ethno-regional and political asso-
ciations, which are patronised by politicians, students have been able to gain
access to political leadership and sway important decisions in their favor. The
government has been more than willing to co-opt students into its political
arrangements because of the symbolic message that it delivers to the rest of the
country. In a young developing country, a political leadership endorsed by an
incipient elite attains a legitimacy that cannot be underestimated.
Thus, because of students’ political clout coupled with the state’s reluc-
tance to be seen as operating in a manner inimical to the development of state
institutions like public universities, it has been difficult for the government to
promote a financial programme that would be seen as diverting funds to the
development of private institutions. Since 1991, Kenya has made ineffectual
attempts to restructure the financing of higher education and introduce more
market-oriented mechanisms. Much bureaucratic rhetoric on the issues has been
voiced, only to fizzle at the first sign of resistance from students (Hughes
1994:197). It took a long time and enduring many student protests for the gov-
ernment to introduce modest fees in the state universities in 1995. The protests,
strikes and accompanying injuries to students, as well as year-long university
closures, raised the nation’s political temperatures to a dangerous level. Since
then, the government’s resolve to alter the financing of higher education has
waned, and no other restructuring in financial mechanism has occurred. The
student/political nexus has meant that the fortunes of the students are inextrica-
bly interwoven with those of the state. Under these circumstances, it is highly
unlikely that a voucher system will see the light of day any time soon.
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The Informal Sector and Political Loose Coupling
While tight coupling between the political state and higher education has been
the linchpin of university development, the converse is true of the informal
training sector. The sector’s coupling with the political state has been, at best,
weak. It has developed largely outside the tight control of the political authori-
ties, its impetus for growth being the influence of demand and supply mecha-
nisms in the labour market. This, however, does not mean that informal train-
ing institutions have been historically apolitical. However, unlike the universi-
ties, their political influence has chiefly been narrow and spasmodic, giving
the impression that the state lacks interest in them. In contrast to the tight link
between universities and the national body politic during President Moi’s reign,
the political class has basically allowed the informal training institutions to
operate on their own, subject to provisions of the Ministry of Education. A
good illustration is the Harambee1 movement by which politicians in the late
1960s and early 1970s mobilised Kenyans to construct Village Polytechnics
and Institutes of Science and Technology. The goal was to provide employ-
ment-related training opportunities for youths who could not gain access to
higher education.
Since then, political interest in these institutions has waned because of two
interrelated factors. The first is the exit of Kenya’s founding father, Jomo
Kenyatta, and the attendant decline in the importance of the Harambee
movement in developing basic education and technical training institutions.
Kenyatta, who believed in grassroots mobilisation through the Harambee
movement, invested politically in non-university education. His strong support
was in primary and secondary education and technical training through Village
Polytechnics and Harambee Institutes of Science and Technology. Numerous
Harambee fund-raising programmes were organised to support these educational
programmes. The end of his reign marked the beginning of Harambee’s decline
as a vehicle for the political mobilisation of financial resources for basic and
technical education. The second factor is the rise in the political ascendancy of
university education after 1980 under Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel arap Moi.
His presidency (1978-2002) saw the largest state political investment in higher
education. State universities grew from one to six. The student population grew
from about 3,000 to around 50,000 (Ngome 2003), and the politicisation of
university affairs became most intense (Munene 1997). The contrast between
the two political leaders could hardly be greater: Kenyatta, a university graduate,
had a passion for basic and technical education, while Moi, with only basic
education, pursued the expansion of higher education with religious zeal.
An additional reason for the failure warrants attention. By the 1980s parental
and student attitudes towards self-employment and, therefore, technical training
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had undergone a radical transformation. Sifuna (1984), in a study on attitudes
towards technical and vocational education in the country, found that only a
miniscule number of students aspired to careers as farmers or craftsmen. Instead,
most aspired for white-collar jobs which did not require any technical education.
In a later study, Ngau (1999) noted that most graduates of technical training
institutions lacked the financial resources and requisite entrepreneurial skill to
embark on self-employment activities. These factors indicate a failure by the
Harambee Institutes of Science and Technology to develop well-articulated
coupling with the labor market, a factor that has led to their rapid decline in
spite of loose coupling with the political system at the sunset of President
Kenyatta’s regime.
The development of informal training institutions, however, has been stimu-
lated by client needs and economic imperatives. Because they are not tightly
linked to the political authorities, they are free from the most serious impedi-
ment towards innovation and reforms. As a result, they can design programmes
and implement guidelines making them more accommodating to programmes
such as the voucher system. As a result, the JKVTP has incorporated players
like the Kenyan Government’s Technical Training Division in the Ministry of
Education, Science and Technology, Kenya’s Ministry of Labour, the World
Bank and the Jua Kali Association of Kenya (its association for informal sector
entrepreneurs), without necessarily raising political temperatures, as would have
been the case in universities. Thus, where loose coupling with the political
system prevails and where economic conditions are conducive, political stakes
are low and innovations like the voucher system can proceed with a minimum
of political reverberations.
Market Coordination
Informal Training and Market Coupling
If Kenya’s state universities and the political system have been tightly coupled,
then the informal training sector has been tightly coupled with the market,
which plays a strategic role in explaining its educational financing innovations.
‘Market’ refers to the extent to which market-related activities and incentive
structures function and flourish. In a market situation, goods or services sell
while a price mechanism provides the equilibrium through which consumers
bargain over what they need, resulting in a consumer-driven market.
Notwithstanding the negative connotation that the market model has elicited
in recent times, especially in Africa (Zeleza 2003), educational institutions
(universities and training institutes included) are marketplaces where educational
programmes and services are sold to fee-paying students. The degree of success
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in this market model rests on the level at which the demand for educational
programmes and services is congruent with their supply at an optimum price.
A number of advantages accrue from the market, the main one being the
incentive to educational institutions to respond to changing economic and social
situations. Faced with the prospect of diminished enrolments, institutions engage
in ‘constant occupational reassignment, with consumer preferences and
occupational preferences reconciled in a shuffling of labor from one field to
another, one specialty to another’ (Clark 1983:162). In addition, the marketisation
of institutional programmes has implications for organisations’ power structures.
Units that generate revenue are generally handsomely rewarded and their influence
flows upwards to the central administrative and policymaking bodies. Thus, unlike
the traditional bureaucratic resource allocation arrangement, the power and
influence in the institution is in the opposite direction (Williams 1987:98).
Perhaps more than any other education sector in Kenya, JKVTP manifests
a well-articulated system of market coordination which would account for the
voucher scheme’s success. Consumers choose among multiple programmes
offered by training providers ranging from the government-owned Kenya In-
stitute of Business, church-sponsored training centers and proprietary entre-
preneurial institutions. This situation reflects a product diversity that is very
different from that of the state universities. Adams (1997) indicates that such
choice has stimulated innovation to reflect the changing market needs in both
worker training and tuition cost reductions. In the two cases cited, the tuition
fell from Ksh. 21,000 (US$280) and Ksh. 37,000 (US$493)2 to equal the actual
value of the voucher, thereby negating the need for trainees to supplement the
voucher and strengthening the consumer market. In sum, this example demon-
strates the classic reality of a market-coordinated training orientation: student
demand and choice determining resource allocations and price structure.
State Universities and Loose Market Coupling
Unlike informal sector training institutes, public universities are loosely coor-
dinated by the market. Until recently, when the institutions began to experiment
with privately sponsored students and the formation of private companies to
market university services and programmes3, very little evidence existed to
demonstrate that market considerations were at the core of the institutions’
strategic thinking. Two factors account for the persistent disarticulation be-
tween the university system and the market, namely explosive graduate unem-
ployment, and distrust in the commodification of knowledge.
The labor market performance of university graduates in Kenya has wit-
nessed a precipitous decline since the mid-1980s, thanks to the inflationary and
recessionary tendencies within the economic structure along with the failure of
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educational reforms to reflect the new socio-economic dispensation. In Table
3, the grim reality that awaits graduates is vividly demonstrated; wage employ-
ment, the key route for university graduates’ entry into the labor market, has
continued to contract even as the informal sector, the principal entry route for
the informal training graduates, has continued to register remarkable growth.
In 1988 employment in the wage-earning sector was well over 77 per cent
while the informal sector hired 20 per cent of the workforce. The reverse was
true by 2000 when the formal sector’s contribution in job creation was a paltry
28 per cent while that of the informal sector was a massive 70 per cent.
The problem of university graduate unemployment and the inability of uni-
versities to address the problem have attracted considerable attention. Only
recently the East African Standard, one of Kenya’s leading daily newspapers,
analyzed the extent of the mismatch between the academic programmes and the
labor market requirements. In one article headlined ‘Is Time Ripe for Universi-
ties to Scrap “Joke Courses”?’ (2004), the correspondent documented cases of
students admitted to programmes with no market potential but for which financial
aid was available from the state and concluded with a poignant question that no
doubt resonated with the masses of unemployed graduates: ‘What is the point of
a degree that adds little or nothing to students’ employment prospects?’
Table 3: Employment Trends in Kenya, 1988–2000
Year Total ‘000’ Wage Self-Employment Informal
Employment (%) and Unpaid Sector (%)
Workers (%)
1988 1736.3 77.5 2.5 20.0
1989 1796.2 76.2 2.5 21.3
1990 2395.0 58.8 2.0 39.2
1991 2557.1 56.4 2.0 41.6
1992 2753.2 53.1 2.0 44.9
1993 2997.5 49.2 1.9 48.9
1994 3355.1 44.8 1.7 53.8
1995 3855.1 40.4 1.6 58.0
1996 4325.8 37.4 1.5 61.1
1997 4698.4 35.1 1.4 63.5
1998 5083.2 32.7 1.4 65.9
1999 5477.5 30.5 1.2 68.2
2000 5893.0 28.4 1.1 70.4
Source: Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey (various issues)
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The failure by universities to address the issues of relevance to employment
needs stems from their historical legacy, which still enjoys considerable sup-
port from academia. The historical traditions of the state universities as far as
workforce production is concerned have always revolved around the produc-
tion of elites for the civil service. The University of Nairobi, the pioneer higher
education institution in the country, was, for instance, founded with the spe-
cific aim of training the emergent colonial civil service. Kenyatta University
began as the largest teacher training college, supplying teachers to government
secondary schools. These traditions have persisted even with the younger state
universities, Egerton, Jomo Kenyatta, Maseno and Moi, all of whose
programmes reflect those of Nairobi and Kenyatta universities. But since the
state has ceased to be the main employer of university graduates, the continued
existence of civil service-oriented programmes and policies within the univer-
sities does not bode well for market coordination.
This inertia is also linked to the prevailing distrust of universities towards
any changes that signify the commodification of knowledge. The experience of
the University of Nairobi’s ‘Parallel’ Programme, an academic programme for
privately sponsored students which has been a major source of additional rev-
enue, is quite instructive. The university has been closed several times due to
conflicts between government-sponsored students and their privately sponsored
counterparts. The former hold that the latter are not academically qualified to
join the universities and insist that their presence has watered down the quality
of the institutions and exacerbated the already critical congestion. Furthermore,
the academics at the university have decried the emerging differentiation based
on disciplinary marketability of this parallel programme (Nyaigotti-Chacha
2002).
Thus, state universities in Kenya have a long way to go before the market
ethos is embraced and domesticated, which policy developed for their success-
ful integration into the institutions’ strategic missions. As we await that mo-
mentous day, we acknowledge that both labor market-orientation and the
commodification of knowledge into marketable goods to consumers – the key
ingredients in a successful voucher programme – are in short supply in Kenya.
Without these important variables, a competitive price allocation mechanism
is unlikely to evolve, and it is inconceivable that a voucher could be sustained
for universities in the same way it has within the informal training sector.
The Policymaking Process
The different policymaking processes in the state universities and the informal
training sector help account for vouchers in the former but not the latter. The
most appropriate definition for our purposes is Fowler’s (2004:9): ‘Public policy
5.munene.p65 06/05/2006, 15:33121
JHEA/RESA Vol. 3, No. 1, 2005122
is the dynamic and value laden process through which a political system handles
a public problem. It includes a government’s expressed intentions and official
enactment as well as its consistent patterns of activity and inactivity’. It fol-
lows, therefore, that the way in which a political system handles a public policy
problem, either through activity or inactivity, determines the successful solu-
tion to the problem. In this regard it is important to consider the policymaking
and policy implementation process as important variables in the successful reso-
lution of the problem.
In their foundational work on the policymaking process, Lindblom and
Woodhouse (1993:23-33) have argued that democratic policymaking needs to
obtain consensus and action on three goals: responsiveness to public senti-
ment, sensible tradeoffs and attention to relevant information. The JKVTP’s
policy development and implementation show a high degree of congruence
with this model.
During the conceptualisation of the financing programmes, it achieved at-
tention to public sentiment through the participatory decision making of inter-
national donors (World Bank), the national political authority (Government of
Kenya, through the Ministry of Labor and Human Resource Development),
and the grassroots informal sector association (the Kenya National Jua Kali
Association). This multi-sectoral collaboration provided a useful forum for scan-
ning the socio-political and economic environment, providing crucial informa-
tion and negotiating the attendant tradeoffs. The outcome was broad-based sup-
port. Among the key areas that this collaborative approach addresses are:
1. The development of a collective vision, mission, goals and objectives.
Areas of disagreements and potential conflicts are resolved prior to the
implementation of the programme.
2. The identification of appropriate implementation mechanisms, includ-
ing voucher disbursement to clients, reimbursement to training provid-
ers, identifying training providers and creating conflict resolution av-
enues.
3. Allaying the concerns of trainees and training providers and dealing with
fears over the system’s functioning. This step prevents stakeholders’ re-
liance on information from the grapevine. Undeniably, the cornerstone
of the programme’s success has been its acceptance by the informal sec-
tor, aided by the World Bank’s financial support and complementary
regulatory support by the state.
State universities, on the other hand, are loosely coupled with democratic
policymaking processes and implementation. Top-to-bottom authoritarianism
has increasingly defined policy formulation and implementation, a situation
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that has led to numerous conflicts between students and academics on the one
hand, and university administrators and the government on the other. Owing to
the tight coupling between the institutions and the political state, system-wide
policy is generated either politically (edicts from political authorities) or bu-
reaucratically (by key civil servants). As Sifuna (1998) has aptly demonstrated,
institution-wide policymaking is the preserve of the top university administra-
tors and appointed officials within administrative units. Unlike the informal
training sector, vertical and horizontal consultation about broad policy issues is
clearly absent.
This policymaking mechanism has been a catalyst for failure because of (a)
the absence of a shared vision, mission, goals and objectives regarding univer-
sity programmes and future directions, leading to suspicion and distrust among
stakeholders; (b) ineffective and inappropriate mechanisms for implementing
new policies, programmes and innovations (e.g. HELB’s ineffectiveness in
developing a voucher and CHE’s inability to supervise state universities), and
(c) Student distrust of state officials and state-initiated higher education re-
form, not stopping short of radicalism and violence.
While policymaking and policy implementation along this line is toler-
able where there is no radical departure from existing values and tradi-
tions, it is insufficient where transformation is the essence. Changes in
financing higher education are transformative, their effects touching the
system as a whole. Without adequate consultation among all the stake-
holders, resistance to change is the outcome. Thus, when the Kenya
Government, under pressure from the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund, introduced tuition payment in university education un-
der the cost-sharing scheme, it was greeted with prolonged nationwide
student riots and destruction of property leading to a year’s closure of
the universities. Similarly, Kenyatta University in 1998 introduced user
fees for e-mail facilities at the institution without consulting the student
leaders. The resulting riots and destruction of the university property led
to the institution’s indefinite closure (Amutabi & Oketch 2003:63).
The paradox is explicit: While the university administration regarded e-mail as
a priority, students did not. We surmise that, under the current authoritarian
policymaking regime of Kenya’s state universities, it is highly unlikely that a
voucher will see the light of day any time soon.
Conclusion and Implications
Our purpose in this article has been to explain why financing education through
a voucher system has shown such remarkable success in Kenya’s informal
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training sector but has yet to take hold in higher education. While numerous
perspectives offered for such failures tend to hinge on economic imperatives
and underemphasise other considerations, we use loose coupling as a conceptual
framework because it is more encompassing. It enables us to take into account
not only economic variables but also political and policy determinants. This
approach is significant since educational institutions are open systems,
influenced by an array of environmental factors.
Our analysis points out that the informal training sector and the university
system coupling systems differ in three areas: (a) the political environment, (b)
market coordination and (c) the policymaking climate. The university system
is tightly coupled with the political state which exercises considerable latitude
in the public university’s affairs. Given the critical role of universities in national
socio-political and economic development, the state has sought to steer univer-
sities in specific directions, thus robbing the institutions of the autonomy and
flexibility required to innovate, not only in financial reforms but also in aca-
demic matters. In addition, university students, a powerful and influential po-
litical interest group, cannot be relied upon to support any reform measure that
appears to transfer public funds to private institutions as a voucher scheme
would purport to do. For higher education, therefore, the political stakes are
high if financial arrangements were to be controlled by market factors.
The parameters are different with the informal sector. The state political
investment has been rather low, and the institutions are only loosely coupled
with the political state. However, it is tightly coupled with the market. Market
determinants such as choice, competition and price allocation mechanisms have
ensured that market coordination is sufficient to sustain a voucher programme,
unlike the university system in which loose coupling with the market has re-
sulted in a paucity of programme choice, scarcity of competition and soaring
unemployment rates for graduates.
In terms of policy, the public universities are tightly coupled with an au-
thoritarian top-down policymaking process. This factor has curtailed intensive
and extensive consultation among all the stakeholders, a necessary condition
for minimizing tensions and surmounting opposition to reforms. In contrast,
the informal sector is loosely coupled with this policymaking model and tightly
coupled with a more democratic, bottom-up approach. This factor has opened
avenues for exhaustive consultation among the various stakeholders in the out-
come of the reform – the political state, foreign donors, the World Bank, the
informal sector organisations and the training providers. As a result, tensions
and conflicts have been ironed out, allowing for a smooth implementation of
the voucher programme.
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We readily acknowledge two fundamental differences between informal
technical training and university education. First, informal sector training is
typically of limited duration and highly flexible in the modes of delivery. These
characteristics create different incentive criteria for clients and training provid-
ers to embrace a voucher system than would be the case in university educa-
tion. The latter usually requires an extended period of study; and for Kenya,
modes of delivery are limited to live sessions on campus. Second, the cost of
financing informal training is very low in comparison to university education
which entails heavy financial investment. The impact of these contrasting sce-
narios and their possible implications needs to be recognised.
That said, what lessons can the university system derive from the success of
the JKVTP? We identify three important ones:
1. Reforms and innovations that target financing of education have a seis-
mic effect within the system. Their aftershocks reverberate far and wide, per-
colating beneath and deep into the system. Thus, such radical reconfigurations
have a high chance of success where consultation among the various constitu-
ents is not only encouraged but actually pursued. This approach promotes a
sharing of information, developing a collective vision and implementation
strategy and assuaging fears. The JKVTP is a good example of such a
collaborative effort.
2. The more the university system continues to be a central plank in the
state’s quest for political legitimacy, the less likely it is that a critical examina-
tion of the current financing mechanism will take place. At its most extreme,
politicisation of higher education has given way to increased reliance on poli-
tics for setting priorities and organising action just as it has led to the elimina-
tion of many long-term goals. As we have seen, the net effect of this situation is
an emphasis on guaranteed loans for public university students, denying the
same for private university students, and the sustaining of irrelevant and out-
dated curricula. The situation has also deterred serious consideration of more
significant issues such as linking curricular reforms to labor market needs and
the changing social conditions.
3. For a voucher-type financing arrangement to materialise, an element of
marketisation of university programmes and services is inescapable. Obviously,
outright commercialisation of the university with a full-blown profit motive
would be detrimental to universities’ missions and reputations. However, uni-
versities can commercialise some of their programmes, products and services
without much harm to their social standing, as the ‘Makerere Miracle’ in Uganda
illustrates. Makerere University has been able to integrate commercial initia-
tives into the fabric of the institution (Mwiria 2003). The key features of its
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success are a diversified curriculum and its linkage to the labor market, im-
proved funding levels and the consequent improvement in academic staff sala-
ries. Previously, the institution was wholly dependent on state funding. However,
with the introduction of market-based reforms, the university can generate 30
per cent of its revenue from internal sources, especially tuition paid by privately
sponsored students (Mukuma 2000:107-11). This fact is significant. The fact
that government-sponsored full-time students at the University of Nairobi rioted
over the presence of privately sponsored part-time students shows that a private/
state dichotomy only invites hostilities. Furthermore, it complicates the process
of developing a fully functional voucher system with broad-based support.
Simply put, for a well-integrated and fully functional private initiative in state
universities that would be attractive to voucher-holding students to be attainable,
universities need to reconfigure their incipient private programmes so that they
constitute part of the university’s organic structure.
As a concluding note, we observe that recent political developments in
Kenya bode well for unlinking state universities from the political system and
introducing market-oriented reforms. In early 2004 President Mwai Kibaki,
Daniel arap Moi’s successor, relinquished his position as the chancellor of all
public universities and in his place appointed six prominent Kenyans as chan-
cellors of the universities. These chancellors were drawn from both the busi-
ness and academic communities. The goal of this radical move was to grant the
universities as much political space as practical for them to be more innovative
in raising additional revenue to supplement state subventions. The universities
have taken their cue. In late 2004 the University of Nairobi appointed its first
vice-chancellor, Dr George Maghoha, after an international search. The new
vice-chancellor is a consummate fundraiser, skilled in strategic planning, with
a knack for developing collaborative partnerships with external donors. From
these developments, it is clear that state universities are gradually awakening
to the reality that the future seems to lie in a tighter coupling with the market,
an important step in the evolution of a voucher-type financing of higher educa-
tion.
Notes
1. Harambee simply means ‘pulling together’. The Harambee movement in-
volves politicians and other leaders mobilizing citizens to contribute fund-
ing for community projects such as the construction of schools, health cen-
ters, cattle dips, and roads. The Harambee concept has also been used to
raise funds for school fees and medical bills. Critics have argued that the
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movement has given the state a viable escape route from its responsibility
of providing social and economic services to the citizens.
2. At the current exchange rate, 1US$ is equal to Ksh. 75.
3. Already, nearly all public universities in Kenya have started private evening
and vocation programmes for fee-paying students. In addition, they have
actively been engaged in the development of short courses and seminars as
a means of supplementing their income. The University of Nairobi has even
incorporated a private company to market and manage its income-generat-
ing activities. These activities, however, remain limited and are not linked
organically to the core mission of the institutions (Nyaigotti-Chacha 2002).
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